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ARTICLE
COUNTERFEITS, COPYING AND CLASS
Ann Bartow*
ABSTRACT
Consumers who want to express themselves by
wearing contemporary clothing styles should not have to
choose between expensive brands and counterfeit products.
There should be a clear distinction in trademark law
between illegal, counterfeit goods and perfectly legal (at
least with respect to trademark law) "knockoffs," in which
aesthetically functional design attributes have been copied
but trademarks have not. Toward that end, as a normative
matter, the aesthetic features of products should not be
registrable or protectable as trademarks or trade dress,
regardless of whether they have secondary meaning, just as
functional attributes of a utilitarian nature are not eligible
for Lanham Act protection. With enough advertising, any
product feature can acquire distinctiveness. Only the
assertive deployment of functionality bars by courts can
prevent the illegitimate and costly construction of
trademark-based product monopolies.
The purported trademark-related harms that stem
from the production and distribution of noncounterfeit
knockoffs are, in reality, the effects of legitimate
competition based on attributes such as price, quality,
consumer appeal, and retail availability, with which
trademark law should not interfere. Repressing or
illegalizing knockoffs illegitimately prevents lower income
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people from procuring and enjoying goods with aesthetic
attributes that are not properly monopolized through
trademark law, and probably perversely increases the
demand for counterfeit items.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring that trademarks indicate a single source, even if that
source is unknown, is supposed to reduce consumers' search costs.'
But protecting trademarks is not supposed to reduce consumers'
options. Any time trademark law constructs are used to keep
anything except counterfeit goods out of the marketplace, the
Lanham Act is being misused. In the context of design-driven
products, this misuse takes the form of enforcing illegitimate
trademarks and trade dress rights in artistic elements.
Manufacturers of high-end, aesthetics-driven consumer goods
strategically manipulate trademark law to engineer the conceptual
conflation of counterfeiting trademarked goods with the copying of
1. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & EcON. 265, 269 (1987). But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1848 (2007) (countering that, rather than to
reduce search costs, trademarks were originally "designed to promote commercial morality and
protect producers from illegitimate attempts to divert their trade").
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design features.2 This is the trademark part of a two-pronged effort
to profoundly discourage and eventually illegalize what is now
perfectly legitimate copying. This endeavor is being pursued
contemporaneously with an ongoing effort to instantiate copyright
protection for certain elite classes of clothing and other high-end
consumables. Corporations generally hate competition and will
take advantage of any legal regime that allows them monopolies in
the marketplace.! The Lanham Act should not serve this function.'
Copying design elements and counterfeiting are two very
different things.' Counterfeiting is the act of putting someone else's
exact trademark on products that were not produced or authorized
by the trademark holder.! Consumers can be tricked by counterfeit
marks into buying inauthentic, lower quality goods, which causes
trademark holders to lose sales and customer goodwill.'
Counterfeiting is a violation of federal trademark law,' and it is also
2. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,404-05 (1999)
(contending that manufacturers of prestige goods claim imitation of aesthetic features as
trademark infringement even though consumers are not likely confused by the imitation).
3. See A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 209-10 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of the U.S. Copyright
Office) (describing one rationale of the proposed legislation as protection of "haute couture
during the period of time in which such high-end clothing is sold at premium prices").
4. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 625,
650-51 (explaining how corporations are using the trademark legal regime in
circumvention of antitrust regulations to bully competitors out of the market).
5. The copyright law part of the equation has been addressed elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Lucille M. Ponte, Echoes of the Sumptuary Impulse: Considering the Threads of Social Identity,
Economic Protectionism, and Public Morality in the Proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 78-80 (2009) (comparing arguments for copyright protection of
fashion designs to historical sumptuary laws); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The
Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687,
1691 (2006) (arguing that copyright protection for product design does not hurt competition or
innovation because "copying is not very harmful to originators").
6. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1700-01 (explaining that while
counterfeiting "plainly infringe[s] trademarks," copying design elements under a different
trademark is generally legal).
7. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:10, at 25-24 to -25 (4th ed. 2011).
8. David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The Criminalization of Trademark
Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1998) (discussing how "low quality fakes" defraud
customers and tarnish the reputation of trademark owners).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006). The provision regarding the remedies for
infringement states:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive; or
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a crime.o Appropriating popular design features, however, does
not infringe trademark law.n
When correctly construed, trademark law does not pose any
legal impediments to copying product features." The aesthetic
attributes of consumer goods should never be accorded
trademark status as trade dress, either via federal registration or
as a matter of federal common law. When misused in this
manner, trademark law provides powers commensurate with
copyright and patent law, but without the related doctrinal
limitations, such as fair use, or concomitant obligations to
invent or create anything new." Inhibiting copying through
trademark law has negative consequences, including
generalized chilling of competition and cultural diffusion, 4 and
weighs heavily upon people of modest economic means. Lower
income people may find possession of high-end luxury items
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to
recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge
that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.
Id.
10. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (Supp. II 2009).
11. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)
("[Tirade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are functional.");
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) ("Consumers
should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian
and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves . . . ."); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (acknowledging the design fixture
acquired secondary meaning, but maintaining "if the design is not entitled to a
design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will");
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) ("[M]ere inability of
the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to support an injunction
against copying or an award of damages for copying that which the federal patent
laws permit to be copied.").
12. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29.
13. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34
(2003).
14. See TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29 (explaining that copying has benefits to
presering a competitive economy); Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 213 (refusing to deprive
consumers of the benefits of competition through application of trademark law to
utilitarian product design); Lunney, supra note 2, at 453 (defining three undesirable
effects of prohibiting imitation).
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unattainable. If the law does not interfere, the market can at least
give them access to comparable styles and fashions, enabling
opportunities to make the same choices between unique, personal
presentation and stylistic conformity as wealthier individuals.
II. PRODUCT FEATUREs ARE NOT PROPERLY "PROTECTABLE" BY
TRADEMARK LAW
Product features can be distinctive and strongly identified with
a particular source. 6 Yet unless they are legally monopolizable
through copyright or patent precepts, competitors are free to copy
them because, when correctly applied, trademark law will not
interfere with the kinds of products that can be manufactured or
sold, or with the way that goods are configured."
The functional attributes of products can, if qualified, be the
subjects of utility patents, but they cannot be protected as
trademarks." Product design elements are not appropriately
protected by trademarks either. Congress has similarly
structured the pertinent intellectual property legislation such
that only design patents and copyright law facilitate aesthetic
monopolies, and then only in limited contexts." Correctly
15. See Andrew Jaynes, Why Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Remains
Entrenched in the Philippines, 21 PACE INTL L. REV. 55, 102 (2009) (suggesting
counterfeiting "mak[es] goods that would otherwise be out of reach affordable").
16. See TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28 (recognizing that some product features may
be easily identified with a specific manufacturer).
17. See id. at 29 ("[U]nless an intellectual property right such as a patent or
copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying."); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) ("[I]f the design is not entitled to a design
patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will.").
18. Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.
2010) ("A novel or distinctive selection of attributes on these many dimensions [of
functional designs] can be protected for a time by a utility patent or a design patent, but it
cannot be protected forever as one producer's trade dress.").
19. Id.; see also Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237 ("[Wlhen an article is unprotected by
a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article."); Kohler Co.
v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 651 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (explaining that
monopolies over product design amounts to "protection that is properly only available
through the design patent or copyright laws"). Reforming the Copyright Act to illegalize
knockoffs in the apparel industry is one approach to monopolizing design features that
some manufacturers are pursuing. See Ponte, supra note 5, at 79-80. Clothing itself does
not usually receive copyright protection under current laws, but specific attributes of
clothing, such as a unique print or design element, may. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra
note 5, at 1699, 1747. Certain players in the garment industry want to expand the scope
of copyright protections for items of clothing and accessories. Id. at 1715. The debate over
whether or not copyright protection should be extended in some form to cover articles of
clothing is both academic and actual, as legislation to do so is currently is pending. See
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong.
(2011) (proposing to amend 17 U.S.C. § 1301 by adding "fashion design" to the list of
copyright-protected original designs). Legal scholars such as Chris Sprigman and Kal
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interpreting the relevant statutes, the Supreme Court has over
many decades held that trademark law does not provide a legal
mechanism for securing exclusive rights to product features,o
though not with complete consistency.2 1 In its most recent
relevant opinion, Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, the Court
stated: "Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of
competition with regard to the utilitarian and [aesthetic]
purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law
that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness."2 While the Court
was on the right track, the marketplace would have been better
served with the establishment of a bright-line rule that more
clearly embedded the value of unfettered competition with
respect to the functional features of consumer goods.
The precise holding was that "in an action for infringement of
unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a
product's design is distinctive, and therefore [protectable], only
upon a showing of secondary meaning."" The case thus instantiated
a rule that product features were eligible for trade dress protection
only if consumers perceived the particular attributes as source-
identifying.2 4 The opinion noted that "product design almost
invariably serves purposes other than source identification," and
Raustiala argue that expanding copyright protections or sui generis copyright-like
protections would not stimulate enhanced creativity in the garment industry. See
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1743-45 (suggesting that enhanced copyright
protection "may chill innovation by empowering larger players to use cease and desist
letters to quash competition"). However, advocates such as Susan Scafidi assert the
contrary. Hearing, supra note 3, at 84 (statement of Susan Scafidi, Visiting Professor,
Fordham Law School, Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University) (arguing that
H.R. 5055 is a "forward-looking measure that lays the groundwork for the future
development of a robust, creative American fashion industry"); see also Sara R. Ellis,
Comment, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of Fashion Design Protection and Why
the DPPA and IDPPPA Are a Step Towards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 78 TENN. L.
REV. 163, 189 (2010) (arguing the swiftness at which knockoffs are created in today's
marketplace stifles not only the famous design houses but emerging designers as well).
20. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29 (refusing trademark protection for
functional product features); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,
215 (2000) (declining trademark protection for product design without a demonstration of
secondary meaning); Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 238 (declining to impose liability for
copying design features unless the design is protected by a design patent); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) (denying trademark protection for an
unpatented article when the article's design features were copied).
21. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171-72 (1995) (allowing color
to act as a trademark when it had acquired a distinctive meaning); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (declining to require secondary meaning
when trade dress is inherently distinctive).
22. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 213.
23. Id. at 216.
24. Id. at 212-13.
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that consumers are aware that product design is usually not
intended to identify the source of a product, but to render it more
useful or appealing.25 But the Court did not go as far as suggesting
that product features were presumptively functional."
This left open two possibilities for using Lanham Act powers
to obtain enforceable monopolies in product design features.
First, obviously, the unregistered product features could be
proven nonfunctional,2 7 and then shown to have acquired
distinctiveness, with secondary meaning linking the features to
the source of the good within consumers' consciousness."
Second, if demonstrably qualifying, they could be
individually registered as trademarks and imbued with the
presumption of validity that registration on the principal registry
provides.29 An alternative determination that the product
features were functional would preclude registration, as would a
finding that the product features were "merely descriptive."o
The availability of these alternatives undermines the
foundational rationale of the Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers holding,
which was the preservation of "the benefits of competition with
regard to the utilitarian and [aesthetic] purposes that product
design ordinarily serves."' This principle ought to have been
articulated more definitively: Consumers should not be deprived of
the benefits of competition with regard to utilitarian or aesthetic
product design attributes by trademark law, period.
A dozen years ago Glynn Lunney brilliantly explained why
trade dress should not be treated like a trademark,2 writing:
First, the mere possibility that trade dress can serve a
trademark function does not mean that a product feature or
25. Id. at 213.
26. Cf Symposium, Panel II: The Global Contours of IP Protection for Trade Dress,
Industrial Design, Applied Art, and Product Configuration, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 783, 829-30 (2010) (positing that after the Court's lack of clarity in
Samara Brothers, Congress stepped in and "creat[ed] a presumption that all product
designs . .. are presumptively functional"). But see Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 214 (noting
in dicta that "[it is true, of course, that the person seeking to exclude new entrants would
have to establish the nonfunctionality of the design feature").
27. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 214.
28. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171-72 (1995).
29. Lanham Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.02 (7th ed. Oct. 2010).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2006).
31. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 213.
32. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes: Why Trade
Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 1131, 1163-67 (2000).
See also Lunney, supra note 2, at 477-84, which presaged a significant portion of the
Supreme Court's analysis in Samara Brothers.
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design is serving as a trademark in any given case. Yet, the
recognition of trade dress as principal register subject
matter encourages the assumption that some aspect of a
product or its packaging claimed as trade dress is
necessarily serving a trademark function. This assumption
is unwarranted, particularly when a party claims a
product's features or configuration, rather than its
packaging, as trade dress. As the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition has recognized, consumers seldom
perceive and rely on product configuration or product
features as a source of information regarding the product,
rather than as an aspect of the product itself. To address
this, the common law required proof that consumers were
relying on the claimed trade dress to identify a product's
source and was careful not to transmute evidence that the
plaintiff had made a particular product feature, shape, or
configuration popular into proof "that the public demand
[was] for the plaintiffs product as such." With the
recognition of trade dress as a trademark, this care has
largely disappeared. Accepting the pretense that trade
dress is a trademark, some courts have extended protection
to dress based upon popularity alone, without requiring any
proof that consumers were relying on the claimed dress to
identify the product's source.
Second, even where trade dress serves an informational
role, trade dress ordinarily is not the only means for conveying
the relevant information. So long as a producer can properly
label her goods and receive protection for her word and symbol
trademarks, the producer has alternative means to convey
source-related information to consumers. Although a second
source for the same information has value, because some
inattentive consumers may miss the first, the benefits
consumers derive from the second source is sharply less than
that of the primary source because the second source simply
duplicates information already available.
Third, the assumption that trade dress is a trademark
encourages a more property-like enforcement regime, where
every technical trespass is actionable, rather than a more
deception-based regime, where the focus is on consumer
deception over the longer term. When trade dress was
protected exclusively under the doctrine of unfair
competition, courts recognized that a certain amount of
initial confusion was inevitable when a competitor began
offering a product that had previously been offered
exclusively by one company. Despite this initial confusion,
they allowed imitation and competitive entry under the
assumption that any initial confusion would work itself out
as consumers and merchants became accustomed to the
714 [ 48:4
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newly competitive market. Unfortunately, as trademark
has lost its deception-based focus, courts have increasingly
protected trademarks against minor, often trivial infractions,
where the likelihood of any long-term confusion is negligible.
With the recognition of trade dress as trademarks, some
courts have extended such property-based protection to trade
dress as well. Yet, the benefits from such protection are
slight, given that the confusion would have resolved itself
without the law's intervention in any event.3
The presumption that anything can be a trademark,
articulated by the Supreme Court in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co.,3 is a pernicious one when reflexively applied to
product features. It can lure fact finders into rewarding the
distributors of popular goods with market monopolies crafted
from trademark law misapprehensions. Associations between
product features and the source of that product, no matter how
strong, never legitimize "protecting" functional attributes under
the Lanham Act." But not all judges understand this.
Lower court opinions about the protectability of product
features in both trademarks and trade dress were wildly
inconsistent before the Supreme Court's Samara Brothers
holding," and continue to be highly unpredictable." This is not
33. Lunney, supra note 32, at 1163-66 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943)).
34. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) ("The
language of the Lanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It says that
trademarks 'includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.'
Since human beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is
capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive. The courts
and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular
shape (of a Coca Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a
particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread). If a shape, a sound, and a
fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?" (alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988))).
35. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001)
("The Lanham Act ... does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because
an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional
feature with a single manufacturer or seller.").
36. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619,
636-37 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing the prior circuit split over what role the customer's
perception of the product should play in determining trade dress protectability); Amy B.
Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix- Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited,
50 IDEA 593, 628-33 (2010) (noting the confusion surrounding the meaning of
functionality both within and between various circuits).
37. Compare Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 356, 358-
59 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that placeholders on car grilles shaped like car manufacturer's logos
could cause post-sale confusion and, thus, violate the manufacturer's trademark if the
placeholders were visible after the manufacturer's emblem was affixed to the placeholder), Fiji
Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
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surprising because the courts fail to employ uniform approaches
to crucial concepts, such as distinctiveness, functionality, and the
likelihood of confusion."
A number of legal scholars in addition to Lunney have offered
cogent critiques of the erratic analytical approaches that judges use
to divine and enforce the rights of trademark holders." There is a
(allowing a square bottle shape to be protected as an element of trade dress because Fiji sought
"to protect the shape of the bottle together with the aesthetic elements such as the font, the
raindrop and the hibiscus flower"), and Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc.,
703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 696-97 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (concluding, based on the possibility of consumer
confusion, that a red dripping wax seal was a trademark entitled to protection from use by
other liquor companies), with Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 722,
726-28 (7th Cir. 2010) (denying trade dress protection because the elements of a chair that the
company sought to protect were "the x-frame profile with three cross bars and a slanted back
support," which are functional elements and were not "added to produce a distinctive
appearance that would help consumers identify the product's source"), and Fuji Kogyo Co. v.
Pac. Bay Int'l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court did not
commit error when it gave "more weight to the utility patents and [the producer's] admissions
than to [the producer's] witnesses" to determine that the producer's fishing line guides were
not protectable as trade dress).
38. See generally Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress
Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 94-109
(2004) (analyzing how circuits use different standards to determine functionality); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1581, 1622-33, 1639-42 (2006) (analyzing how the different "core factors," such as the
similarity of the marks, the defendant's intent, the proximity of the goods, the strength of the
plaintiffs mark, and evidence of actual confusion, affect trademark protection); Cohen, supra
note 36, at 639-50, 688-89 (showing how the various circuit courts have interpreted TrafFix
differently, with some courts applying a narrower test than the test articulated in TrafFix).
39. See, e.g., Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 121-23 (2010)
(critiquing the courts' use of post-sale confusion to limit the ability of consumers to purchase
knockoff goods); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 616-21 (2006) (attacking the moral and economic policy
justifications for prohibiting free riding on another's goodwill); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark
D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1703, 1713-14 (2007)
(critiquing the trademark use doctrine as being ineffective and advocating more established
doctrines such as fair use defenses); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A
Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IoWA L. REv. 611, 731-32 (1999) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie, Death of Ontology] (proposing that a teleological approach is superior to the current
method of determining scope of trade dress protection, which "suggest[s] that functionality is
presumed to negate distinctiveness"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for
Trademark Law, in TRADE MARKs AND BRANDs 140, 150-56 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008)
(analyzing how linguistic concepts can assist jurists in determining the appropriate level of
trademark protection); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1244-45 (2007) (arguing that the
threshold approach to genericide of trademarks should be replaced with a sliding-scale
approach); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1367-38 (2008) (explaining that the Playboy
decision's reasoning "would impede a whole universe of uses that trademark law allows"
because the decision limits information competitors can convey); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 814-
15 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs] (stating
courts have expanded the initial interest confusion doctrine to trademarks on webpages despite
the doctrine's "elegant rationale ... not translat[ing] readily into the online context"); Rochelle
2011] COUNTERFEITS, COPYING AND CLASS 717
rough consensus among most academics that courts are inclined to
overprotect trademarks."o In consequence, trademark holders can
leverage their marks to obtain competitive advantages that
trademark law is not doctrinally intended to confer.
A. The Conflation of Copying and Counterfeiting
One explanation for jurisprudential variability, which is
specific to Lanham Act-based protection of product configuration,
is the tendency toward analytical conflation of copying with
counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is clearly illegal, as well as
infringing.4' It entails wholesale copying of trademarks as well as
design features.42 A perusal of judicial opinions in trademark
Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying
and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY 261, 290-92 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) ("Mrademark law especially needs ... a better account
of the reasonable consumer."); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author's Name as a Trademark: A
Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of "Paternity"?, 23 CARDoZo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 379,386-
89 (2005) (observing, in the context of authorship, that it may be necessary to list the creator of
a product on the product's label to avoid false representations); Mark A. Lemley & Mark
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 443-46 (2010) (addressing the recent
expansion in trademark protection and asserting that there should be a materiality
requirement for certain trademark claims); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning
Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REv. 137, 187-89 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Owning
Mark(et)s] (proposing that courts should use a "trademark injury" doctrine to help decide
trademark infringement (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1728-31 (1999)
(arguing that, even if the atmospherics associated with trademarks have value, these
atmospherics do not justify expansive trademark protection); William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 66-71 (2008) (listing the disadvantages of the
multifactor likelihood of confusion standard); McKenna, supra note 1, at 1896 (exposing how
recent trademark law has deviated from its traditional focus of "protectling] producers from
illegitimate diversions of customers they had worked to attract"); Mark P. McKenna,
Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 816-19 (declaring that
courts should change their analysis on trademark use to focus on whether the consumer
understands the use of the trademark to indicate the source of the good); Lisa P. Ramsey,
Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REv. 1095, 1159-64 (2003)
(advancing an argument that trademark protection for general descriptive terms of a good is
unconstitutional); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 528-29, 564-65 (2008) (disapproving of using cognitive science as
a basis for justifying trademark dilution protection).
40. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 39,
at 802 (arguing that courts have expanded trademark rights by broadening the definition of
confusion in the internet context); Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 39, at
156 (asserting that the "market preemption and free-riding arguments" employed by courts
"have contributed to the expansion of trademark law beyond its traditional conceptual
moorings"); McKenna, supra note 1, at 1904 (noting the recent shift in trademark protection
from requiring that the infringer be in competition with the mark owner to the unpredictable
likelihood of confusion factors, which "generally has worked in the mark owner's favor").
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (providing a civil cause of action for trademark
infringement when goods or services are counterfeited); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (Supp. II
2009) (criminalizing the use and trafficking of counterfeit goods and services).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) ("A counterfeit is a spurious mark which is identical
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cases reveals that, conceptually, copying retains a residue of evil,
even when it falls far short of counterfeiting.
When acts of copying elicit negative emotional reactions,
urges to punish those responsible seem almost instinctive. In
the context of advocating for stronger intellectual property
protections for the designs of wearable consumer goods, Scott
Hemphill and Jeannie Suk concede that knockoffs "disrupt[ed]
the ability of the wealthy to distinguish themselves as a group
through the signal of fashion."" But Hemphill and Suk appear
thoroughly disgusted with this prospect, writing:
At bottom, though, the main reason not to accommodate the
lovers of cheap fashion knockoffs is more basic. It is the
same reason that we do not have a legal regime that
permits people freely to make and sell photocopies of
another author's book and retain the profits. It is the theory
of incentives. Obviously, people always want to purchase
inexpensive copies of creative works or have them for free.
The reason to disallow it is not to deprive them of that
benefit but rather to provide creators with an incentive to
create. That is no less true in fashion.45
"Lovers of cheap fashion knockoffs" are framed by Hemphill
and Suk as enemies of creativity who should be consigned to
decorating their bodies and lives only with the stylistic palettes
they can afford.46 This view of social justice requires an economic
class based aesthetic ordering which regulates the
communication of status by commoditizing designs as well as
brands. Those who cannot afford elite trademarks must also
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A) (2006) (defining a counterfeit trademark as a
mark "that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on
the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use").
43. See, e.g., Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d
Cir. 2000) ("[A] loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it
off to the public as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving
the status of owning the genuine article at a knockoff price."); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki
Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging a finding of bad
faith when a company has prior knowledge of another's trademark and intentionally copies
similar trade dress features); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1955) (proclaiming that, when there
is a likelihood of confusion, the alleged infringer's intention to "reap financial benefits
from poaching on the reputation" of another becomes relevant in determining whether the
copier's conduct is actionable).
44. C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1153, 1179 (2009).
45. Id. at 1180.
46. See id. at 1179 (describing the views of those who want to maintain fashion's
status-signaling effects).
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forgo associated styles, cuts, textures, flourishes, and colors.
The basis for the distinction between copying and
counterfeiting is partly rooted in the consumer protection goals of
trademark law.47 Protecting consumers from inadvertently
purchasing counterfeit goods requires keeping the counterfeit
goods out of circulation generally.4 8 Keeping counterfeit goods out
of distribution channels is understandably seen as a social good.49
Mark holders can reap the value of their brands, for better or
worse, and consumers are able to accurately connect the two.
Preventing competitors from copying the aesthetic attributes
of others' products, however, does not benefit most consumers.o
Rather, barriers to copying impede competition and, therefore,
reduce consumer choices." But punishing noncounterfeiting
copiers can also be seen as a social good by judges who consider
such free riding to be legally wrong.52
As a matter of existing trademark law, counterfeiting is
actionable; copying unprotectable design features is not, and
discerning the difference between the two is straightforward and
simple." But the clarity of this important distinction often escapes
lower courts. Consumer goods manufacturers convince some jurists
that it is unfair for one company to copy the designs of another."' In
47. Cf McKenna, supra note 1, at 1860-61, 1896-99 (explaining the shift from
traditional trademark principles, which protected producers, to modern trademark principles,
which protect consumers by preventing confusion and encouraging "honest competition").
48. See Steven N. Baker & Matthew Lee Fesak, Who Cares About the
Counterfeiters? How the Fight Against Counterfeiting Has Become an In Rem Process, 83
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 762-64 (2009) ("Where counterfeiters are peddling falsely marked
goods, the seizure of the counterfeit goods has the effect of immediately stopping this
unfair competition. As a consequence, consumers are denied access to illegitimate (and
perhaps inferior) sources for the desired product . . . .").
49. See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)
(explaining how counterfeit goods may lower the quality of goods produced by the mark owner,
which "in turn harms those consumers who wish to purchase higher quality goods").
50. See Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 640 (6th
Cir. 2002) (endorsing the view that the copying of goods and products "preserves competition,
which keeps downward pressure on prices and encourages innovation").
51. For an impressively comprehensive take on this point, see Lunney, supra note 2,
at 422-31, where he argues that trademark law accords monopolies to dominant brands,
making it economically infeasible for other producers to compete.
52. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 39, at 146-52 (asserting
that free riding arguments are "actually motivating courts' decisions in a variety of cases,
particularly those at the edges of trademark protection").
53. See Elizabeth Ferrill & Tina Tanhehco, Protecting the Material World. The Role
of Design Patents in the Fashion Industry, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 251, 254 (2011) (giving an
example of a counterfeit good as "a bag with the exact same design and logo of a high-end
designer, like Chanel" and stating that a knockoff is a "close copy ... using a similar
shape, similar print, and similar materials" without the "exact Chanel logo or design").
54. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 413-14 (6th Cir.
2006) (determining there was a likelihood of confusion that a toy modeled after a Hummer
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response, these judges bowdlerize legitimate copying into an
actionable source identification problem" and, therefore, doctrinally
something that trademark laws can appropriately address.
Any given manufacturer may assert that, because it is the sole
or market-dominant source of a particular good, consumers
overwhelmingly associate the product with the company, and the
purpose of trademark law is to keep this association between the
product and its source strong and pure." The claim can seem rather
compelling: The manufacturer was the first to have a product on the
market, and perhaps spent a significant amount of money
advertising and promoting the product to drum up interest from
shoppers. For another company to then swoop in with an equivalent
product and profitably take advantage of consumer demand that
would have never existed without the risk taking and resource
investments of the first company seems grossly unfair. Some judges
respond to this perceived injustice by declaring the competition's
goods to be a trademark or trade dress infringement."
1~
vehicle was associated with the maker of the actual Hummer vehicle); Hermbs Int'l v.
Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting that
knockoffs confuse third parties about the authenticity of the product).
55. See Lunney, supra note 2, at 404-08 (arguing that, in the context of
trademark protection for knockoff goods, "[tihe proffering of this [point of sale
confusion] rationale seems ... little more than a rote recital, intended to raise the
specter of possible confusion and to create some tenuous link to trademark's
deception-based foundations").
56. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 39, at 145-46 (criticizing
market preemption and free riding bases for finding and punishing trademark
infringement).
57. See, e.g., Bos. Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33-35 (1st Cir. 1989)(creating a rebuttable presumption of the likelihood of confusion when a market entrant
intentionally copies an established company's mark); see also Lemley & McKenna,
Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 39, at 147-48, 148 n.44 ("In spite of the weakness of the
confusion arguments, courts in some cases found infringement because they were moved
by their belief that the defendants were mere free riders.").
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Here is a fictional illustration of how this can happen:
Company A begins selling a large quantity of purple batwing
capes, but cannot lawfully monopolize purple batwing capes
with copyrights" or design patents. When Company B notices
the capes' popularity and profitability, it launches its own line
of purple batwing capes, using its own distinctive trademarks,
which are nothing like the trademarks in use by Company A.
The shape and color of the batwing capes, however, are very
similar, and Company B's capes are distributed in the same
sorts of retail outlets. Company A sees its sales decline, as
some prospective customers opt for Company B's offering.
Company A immediately files a request for an injunction
under the Lanham Act, asserting that because it has been the
dominant (and perhaps only) supplier of purple batwing capes
in the marketplace, consumers will incorrectly assume
Company A also produced Company B's offering. Company B
opposes any restraining order, pointing out that it is using a
logo or word mark completely different from the ones deployed
by Company A, which is displayed prominently on the labels
and hangtags of the capes it produces. Company B explains
that it selected the shape and color of its product to be as
appealing as possible to consumers. Company B also points out
that the shade of purple is commonplace and the shape of the
cape was not pioneered by Company A, but rather known and
used for decades by a myriad of others.
Company B should prevail. The color and the shape of the
purple batwing capes are functional, primarily in an aesthetic
sense, endowing the wearer with the quirkily appealing
sartorial appearance of an incorrigibly bohemian artist or an
extra who has disapparated from the set of a Harry Potter
movie. The structure of the cape is useful in a utilitarian
manner as well: the wearer's arms are not constricted, and
there is plenty of extra fabric to protect a school satchel from
the elements or to shelter a pet owl. The correct
jurisprudential response to the plaintiffs demand would be to
deny the injunction in accordance with the Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co." and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.60
58. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that Congress has limited
extending copyright protection to nonfunctional product features).
59. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1964)
(holding that copying may not be enjoined if the product is not patented or
copyrighted).
60. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) ("But if
the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it
can be copied at will.").
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cases and their more contemporary iterations, Samara
Brothers" and TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc." This would force Company A to compete with Company B
for purple batwing cape customers on factors such as quality and
price, or through creative advertising.
Unfortunately, some judges will fail to recognize that cape
copying has been conflated instrumentally with cape
counterfeiting by the plaintiff. They will be persuaded that
Company B's copying could be confusing to consumers,
resulting in lost sales, lost market share, or reputational
harms, and they will erroneously enjoin the defendant from
producing purple batwing capes on Lanham Act grounds.
Because Company A was the first, and for a time the only,
producer of purple batwing capes, consumers will strongly
associate Company A with the product.63  This is
incontrovertible. But trademark law is not supposed to reward
initial market entrants with prolonged marketplace
exclusivity. It is not supposed to facilitate monopolistic control
over goods or services at all." Yet if a judge can be convinced
that choosing between two purple batwing cape vendors will
likely confuse some reasonably prudent consumers, and the
judge does not understand functionality to be a robust limiting
principle, she may issue an injunction preventing Company B
from "unfairly" entering or remaining in the retail batwing
cape market.
Now, consider the same basic hypothetical with a garment
substitution. Instead of purple batwing capes, the articles of
clothing at issue are white cotton t-shirts. There are many different
sources for white cotton t-shirts, so the judge hypothesized above
might assume that prospective purchasers more readily check
packaging, or labels printed or sewn into shirts, to discern
information about the manufacturer and are, therefore, less likely
to make erroneous assumptions about source. Confusion would be
considered unlikely, and this would mean that trademarks for
white cotton t-shirts got less protection than trademarks for purple
batwing capes, even though the marks might be far more widely
61. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 208, 216 (2000)
(affirming an award for damages together with injunctive relief).
62. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 34-35 (2001)
(considering functionality in the context of trade dress claims).
63. See Dinwoodie, Death of Ontology, supra note 39, at 657, 682 (describing the
assimilationist philosophy as an assumption that new designs are regarded as inherently
distinctive and source-identifying based on the uniqueness of the product).
64. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
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advertised and recognizable to consumers.
Doctrinally, it does not make any sense to protect one
trademark more than another simply because it is associated
with a less commonplace product. Nor should the application
of trademark law precepts carve out a trademark-rooted
monopoly for any type or style of garment, ever. But when it
appears as though something unfair and copying-related is
happening that copyright law cannot be stretched to address,"
trademark law can unfortunately present itself as an
instrument of rough justice.
To move from the fictional to the actual, it is important to
note that since the decision in Samara Brothers, actual
product features that have been accorded trademark or trade
dress protection, or at least survived summary judgment on a
trademark or trade dress claim, include: "the exterior
appearance and styling of [a] vehicle design which includes the
grille, slanted and raised hood, split windshield, rectangular
doors, squared edges, etc.";66 engagement and wedding ring
designs;" and "the overall mottled look" of pressboard."
In Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., Louis
Vuitton claimed an unregistered trademark denoted as
"Multicolore," which consisted of a design plus color and
entwined LV initials, displayed in thirty-three colors and
printed on a white or black background."
65. See Jenna Sauers, How Forever 21 Keeps Getting Away with Designer
Knockoffs, JEZEBEL (Aug. 25, 2011), http://jezebel.com/5822762/how-forever-21-keeps-
getting-away-with-designer-knockoffs ("Forever 21 continues to copy because copying
a dress design-even copying a dress design clearly made first by someone else, even
copying a dress with stitch-by-stitch exactness-isn't in and of itself illegal in the
U.S. 'Because the law has been so reluctant to focus on fashion specifically as an
appropriate subject for protection, has been so reluctant to acknowledge fashion as a
creative medium, we-and by "we" I mean the legal profession-have been called on
to pull and stretch other areas of intellectual property to cover bits of fashion,'
Scafidi explained. 'So trademark can be stretched to cover the label. Trade dress, a
subset of trademark, stretched a little further to cover very iconic designs. Copyright
pulled in to cover jewelry and to cover fabric prints, jewelry because it is like a little
mini sculpture and not merely a useful article. Occasionally, patent pulled in to
protect functional elements, like Velcro, or a zipper. . . . So intellectual property sort
of stretches these bits to cover parts of fashion, leaving most of fashion naked and
exposed.'").
66. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Tacori Enters. v. Rego Mfg., No. 1:05cv2241, 2008 WL 4426343, at *1, *15--18
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2008).
68. Fibermark, Inc. v. Merrimac Paper Co., No. 01-CV-11159-DPW, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26866, at *1, *39-41 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2003).
69. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.
2006).
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Louis Vuitton maintained that the polychromatic display
itself was an essential part of its trademarked design, and that
other handbag manufacturers were barred from creating
handbags using Louis Vuitton's synergistic combination of color
and defined design .7o Dooney & Bourke ultimately prevailed,
after extended litigation, on the bases that neither a likelihood of
confusion nor dilution had been established.7' That an arguably
mundane combination of color and design was found protectable
is the unfortunate part of the dispute's trademark law legacy.
Although the outcome was correct, a better holding would have
been that while Louis Vuitton's trademarks were protectable, the
configuration of the marks was aesthetically functional. A
symmetrical pattern of brightly colored roman letters is a design
feature, not a mark in and of itself.
In Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle
Outfitters, Inc.," plaintiff Abercrombie & Fitch attempted to
convince the Sixth Circuit that "1) the designs of the goods
themselves, 2) the design of the catalog created to sell its
70. Id. at 115.
71. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375-77,
389-90, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
72. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619,
635 (6th Cir. 2002) ("In sum, the three things Abercrombie seeks to protect constitute
trade dress." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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products by, among other things, cultivating an image it wants
consumers to associate with its products, and 3) features of its
in-store presentation associated with the sale of its products" all
constituted protectable trade dress." Ultimately the court
correctly concluded that Abercrombie & Fitch's clothing designs
were not protectable because they were functional, despite their
acquired distinctiveness, writing:
Abercrombie's complaint itself identifies the functions of
the design elements it selected: use of the word performance
convey[s] the image of an active line of... clothing; use of
the words authentic, genuine brand, trademark, and since
1892 convey the reliability of the .. . brand; and so on. Use
of these elements in combination with one another and with
Abercrombie's trademarks on clothing bearing primary
color combinations ... in connection with solid, plaid and
stripe designs and made from all natural cotton, wool and
twill fabrics creates reliable rugged and/or athletic casual
clothing drawn from a consistent texture, design, and color
palette. Were the law to grant Abercrombie protection of
these features, the paucity of comparable alternative
features that competitors could use to compete in the
market for casual clothing would leave competitors at a
significant non-reputational competitive disadvantage and
would, therefore, prevent effective competition in the
market.74
When it decided to compete head-to-head with Abercrombie
& Fitch, American Eagle Outfitters took a risk that consumers
would not find their products equally appealing. As trademark
scholars across the philosophical spectrum have noted, the
commercial appeal of otherwise identical products can vary
greatly depending on the trademarks they carry. American
Eagle Outfitters gambled that consumers were interested in
certain styles of clothing regardless of the source, and won.
The company's success at luring customers to buy equivalent
products that carried trademarks of lesser prestige obviously
hurt Abercrombie & Fitch, but not in a way that is legally
compensable.7 ' The fact that people were happy to pay less for
73. Id. at 633.
74. Id. at 642-43 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 274 (noting that trademark
protection enables name-brand manufacturers to command higher prices than
identical generic goods); Litman, supra note 39, at 1725-28 (suggesting consumers
trick themselves into buying a more costly product, even if a cheaper product is
available, when the trademark they value is attached to the higher priced product).
76. Abercrombie & Fitch, 280 F.3d. at 624 ("[T]he clothing designs A & F seeks a
monopoly on are functional as a matter of law, and therefore not protectable as trade
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certain styles of clothing, even though this meant forgoing
Abercrombie & Fitch labels, is not a Lanham Act problem. Yet,
American Eagle Outfitters had to endure plausible threats of
injunctions and infringement liability."7 A less financially secure
competitor might have folded under the pressure. The outcome of
this dispute was ultimately correctly decided, but the analysis
would have been faster and the correct outcome more certain if
there was a well-understood, consistently applied bright-line rule
against protecting product features with trademark law.
III. TRADEMARKS ARE NOT APPROPRIATELY VESTED WITH SUPER
COPYRIGHT OR DESIGN PATENT POWERS
Judges are not the only legal actors who incorrectly attribute
trademark powers to product features. In some cases, in an effort
to preemptively prevent competition, manufacturers persuade
the Patent & Trademark Office to register product features as
trademarks.7 ' The test for determining whether a product design
is functional for purposes of registration is less robust than what
a mark holder is required to prove in the context of a trade dress
infringement suit.] Courts that comprehend this will hold
inadvisably registered marks in product features invalid. But
given their presumption of validity, these registrations position
ignorant judges to erroneously treat trademark law as a super
proxy for design patents or copyright law: "proxy" in the sense
that it is deployed to monopolize creative attributes despite a
lack of constitutional grounding,o and "super" in the sense that it
potentially has far more power and longevity than either design
patents or copyrights would afford. According trademark power
to decorative product attributes provides design patent- like
protection to aesthetic features of useful objects," and does so
dress; the A & F Quarterly constitutes non-functional distinctive trade dress, but the
American Eagle catalog is not confusingly similar to it, as a matter of law.").
77. Id. at 626, 635.
78. See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark Protection of Live Animals: The Bleat Goes
On, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 715, 729 (2011) (emphasizing that in order to
required trademark protection for trade dress, the Patent and Trademark Office "must be
convinced that protectable elements remain after generic and functional attributes are
conceptually removed from the design").
79. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 613-15, 637-39 (providing an example of a court
ordering a trademark registration to be cancelled).
80. Congress's copyright and patent powers come from the Intellectual Property
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, while its trademark powers are derived from the
Commerce Clause. Bone, supra note 39, at 578 n.162.
81. Design Patent Application Guide, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http-/www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/types/designapp.jsp#differ (last modified Feb. 11,
2011); see Burgunder, supra note 78, at 725-26 (warning of the potential for trademark
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much faster and far more inexpensively than actually obtaining a
design patent would. Trademarks can be registered more cheaply
and predictably than design patents can be prosecuted." Unlike a
design patent, which expires after fourteen years, a trademark
registration potentially lasts forever."
Unique Sports Products, Inc. v. Ferrari Importing Co."
demonstrates the ongoing folly of allowing registration of color-
alone trademarks, contrary to Qualitex." Color is a product
feature, and color-alone trademarks hamper competition."
Unique Sports Products has a trademark-contrived, legally
enforceable monopoly in light blue tennis racket grip tape." Light
blue is a popular color with consumers." Unique's registered mark
in the color means that competitors are unable to compete for
consumers with this color preference." So consumers have fewer
law to interfere with the monopolistic goals of design patents when trademarks protect
"unpatented useful attributes").
82. See David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 294-95 (1999) (recognizing that submission of design patent
applications requires considerable expense, time, and expertise).
83. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006) (providing that trademark registration lasts
for a period of ten years), and 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2006) (permitting trademark
registration renewal at the end of each successive ten-year registration period), with 35
U.S.C. § 173 (2006) (limiting design patent protection to fourteen years).
84. Unique Sports Prods., Inc. v. Ferrari Importing Co., No. 1:09-CV-660-TWT, 2011
WL 284442, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2011). In this color-alone trademark infringement
case, the district court found some evidence that the light blue overwrap grip for tennis
rackets was distinctive of "Tourna Grip" overwrap grip sold by Unique Sports Products,
Inc. However, the court held that Ferrari Importing Co. did not violate the final order
enjoining it from selling light blue overwrap grip with speckles and chamois texture
because Ferrari sold light blue overgrip tape without speckles and chamois texture. Id. at
*7-8.
85. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 158, 162-63 (1995) ("[A]
product's color is unlike fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive words or designs, which almost
automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of
Anti Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 266-67 (2008-2009) (opining that the majority of
people do not view colors alone as "independent source identifiers" and color-alone marks
are "simply unable to perform as inherently distinctive trademarks").
86. See Paul R. Morico, Protecting Color Per Se in the Wake of Qualitex v. Jacobson,
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 571, 580 (1995) ("The biggest barrier to acquiring
trademark rights in a color mark ... may be the perceived existence of a competitive need
for the color.").
87. See Unique Sports Prods., 2011 WL 284442, at *1 (noting that Unique Sports
Products received a federal trademark for the light blue color featured on the Tourna Grip
products in 2001 and later negotiated a settlement that resulted in a consented court
order enjoining Ferrari Importing Co. from using the specified shade of light blue color).
88. Id. at *3.
89. Id. at *1, *6 (discussing the inability of competitors to use the light blue color for
overwrap grip because such use violated Unique Sports Products, Inc.'s registered trademark);
see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (providing that any person who copies a registered mark without
the permission of the registrant is subject to liability in a civil action).
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choices. They may have to forgo tape that works better, or tape that
is cheaper, to obtain the aesthetic statement they prefer. Or vice
versa. Because Unique is the only company that can manufacture
and distribute racket grip tape in that color, there is a strong
association between light blue racket grip tape and the company.
But that association is not properly protected by trademark law.
Copying is most meaningful as a copyright law construct.
Making identical copies is literal copying, while copying portions
of someone else's creation may result in a second work that is
substantially similar to the first. But some unauthorized copying
may be noninfringing because it is insubstantial, it is fair use, or
the attributes being copied are not susceptible to copyright
protection."o
Copyright protections vest automatically and last a very long
time,91 but are not always available for functional items,92 and
even when they are, the protections may be very thin.9"
Convincing a court that two similar items are likely to cause
confusion to consumers is probably a lot easier than establishing
copyright infringement rooted in a claim of substantial
similarity.94 The uncopyrightability of acts and ideas creates a lot
of latitude for creative overlapping.
In addition, the scope of trademark law's fair use doctrine is
much more circumscribed than that of copyright law, making
90. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107 (2006) (providing that fair use of a copyrighted work is
not infringement and that copyright protection does not extend to "any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery"); see also William F.
Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11
CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 667, 698 (1993) ("There is no infringement if the copying
involves only [unprotectable] elements, such as ideas, processes or facts, or if only
insubstantial similarities exist between the expression of the two works." (footnote
omitted)).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (providing that a copyright in a work subsists from
its creation and endures for the "life of the author and 70 years after the author's death").
92. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-48
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the "Ribbon" rack was not copyrightable because its form and
function were "inextricably intertwined" and its "ultimate design [was] as much the result
of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic choices"); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp.,
773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the Barnhart forms were not copyrightable
since the artistic features were inseparable from the forms' use as utilitarian articles).
93. See Express, LLC v. Fetish Grp., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1226-27 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (providing for thin copyright protection for "virtually identical copying" when a
minimum amount of creativity exists beyond the simple combination of elements).
94. Compare Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.'s Team Props., Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 632 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (describing the likelihood of confusion test, which
allows the court to consider any relevant factor to determine whether there is "more than
a mere possibility of confusion"), with Express, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (describing the
test for determining substantial similarity as a two-part test consisting of both an
extrinsic test and an intrinsic test).
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enjoining unauthorized uses simpler and more powerful."
Though both trademark and copyright law tolerate secondhand
sales,96 it is hard to think of trademark law homologues to
activities such as time shifting or making a backup copy.
For an example of a case in which trademark law functioned
quite transparently as a super copyright and/or design patent
power, consider Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc." Moen manufactures
kitchen faucets and has obtained federal trademark registrations
on several of them, including the one below, which it calls part of
its "Legend" series."
Another plumbing fixture company, Kohler, likely noticed
that this shape was popular with consumers and wanted to
market a competing faucet that made a very similar aesthetic
impression." So Kohler opposed Moen's application to trademark
the shape of the faucet but was unsuccessful. 0 The case was
decided before Samara Brothers and TrafFix Devices, but the
arguments that allowed Moen to prevail are still made, and
sometimes prevail, even today.' The court explicitly endorsed
95. See McGeveran, supra note 39, at 79, 120-21 (noting that trademark fair use
facilitates expressive uses of trademarks but not competitive commercial uses likely to
cause confusion).
96. See David W. Barnes, Free-Riders and Trademark Law's First Sale Rule, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 457, 461 (2011) (discussing the application of
the first sale doctrine to trademarks, copyrights, and patents).
97. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering whether
the definition of trademark excludes trademark protection of product configurations).
98. Id.
99. See id. (conveying that a study of licensed plumbers found that 82% identified the
faucet and 83% identified the handle as a Moen product); Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 5-6,
Kohler, 12 F.3d 632 (No. 92-2350), 1992 WL 12124137 at *5--6 (arguing that allowing copying
would serve the public interest as long as the competitor's product was marked with a
distinguishing trademark).
100. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 633.
101. See Complaint at 19-20, Sport Helmets, Inc. v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
No. 1:10-CV-10179-RGS (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2010) (arguing that the Cascade lacrosse
helmet design configuration is distinctive and the consuming public associates the design
with Cascade). Another example of a design configuration trademark infringement claim
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the view that "protecting" the faucet design benefitted
consumers, stating: "Innovation in product design and marketing
for the purpose of enhancing producer identity reduces the costs
to consumers of informing themselves about the product source
so that they can either continue purchasing the products from
particular producers or avoid the products from those producers
altogether."'o In other words, the court stated that because Moen
was first on the market with that particular faucet configuration,
consumers associate the product with Moen, and trademark law
appropriately preserves that connection by fencing out the
confusingly similar faucets of competitors like Kohler. That
Kohler plumbing fixtures might be cheaper, better made, or
preferable to consumers on any other basis did not give Kohler
the right to make faucets in the same style as Moen's Legend, or
give consumers the ability to buy them.
The court also wrote that "trademark protection is relatively
weak because it precludes competitors only from using marks
that are likely to confuse or deceive the public."o' This relative
weakness probably came as a surprise to Kohler. Because the
faucet itself is a registered mark, Kohler cannot even today use
the design without infringing the mark. While copyright
protection for this faucet as a sculptural work is thin, if it exists
at all, and as an award of a design patent would have expired
years ago, Moen's trademark is potentially perpetual.
A. Noncounterfeit Knockoffs
When popular aesthetic features are replicated by a
competitor, these copies are often called knockoffs,'04 but
was brought by Gibson Guitar Corp. and involved a registered trademark on a signature
"Les Paul" single cutaway guitar body design. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith
Guitars, LP, 325 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843 (M.D. Tenn. 2004), rev'd in part, vacated in part,
423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005). The district court held that Paul Reed Smith Guitar's PRS
Singlecut version was in violation of Gibson's trademark and enjoined Paul Reed from
manufacturing, selling, or distributing the PRS Singlecut guitar. Id. at 852, 855.
However, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that there was "no basis on which Gibson can
show [consumer] confusion that would demonstrate trademark infringement in violation
of the Lanham Act" and vacated the injunction against Paul Reed. Gibson Guitar Corp. v.
Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 553 (6th Cir. 2005). In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy stated that if it were found that the shape of Gibson's guitar was source-
identifying under the circumstances, then Gibson should be entitled to show evidence that
the competitor's mark causes consumer confusion. Id. at 555-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
102. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 643-44.
103. Id. at 637.
104. See, e.g., Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 53, at 254 (noting that knockoff
manufacturers mimic elements of original designs, including the shape, print, or
materials).
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sometimes the term is used synonymously with counterfeit,"o'
which muddies important distinctions between the two. Some of
this blurring seems intentional and instrumental. The term
"knockoff" as used in this Article means a good in which
functional product features have been copied but legitimately
protectable trademarks have not."o' If Kohler had copied the
Moen design, but unambiguously marketed its Legend-like faucet
as a Kohler good, the fixture could have been described as a
knockoff under this definition.
Knockoffs that do not sport counterfeit labels are not aimed
at deceiving consumers."' They are intended to provide a
particular design or aesthetic at an affordable price to meet
consumer demand for a specific style, rather than for a precise
brand.'8 Knockoffs bearing authentic, source-identifying labels
are not counterfeit goods.o' Their production and distribution are
not acts of trademark infringement either, unless the design
elements copied also constitute trademarks, or serve as
protectable aspects of trade dress because they are nonfunctional
and source identifying."o Yet knockoffs are still sometimes
deemed, incorrectly, to run afoul of trademark laws. This hurts
the penurious and the poor by reducing competition, and
therefore, consumer choices.
Humans have a powerful need to define and express
themselves with their possessions."' Hemphill and Suk have
persuasively argued that many consumers have a profound drive
105. Id.
106. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Phat Cat Carts, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (M.D.
Fla. 2007) (defining a functional feature of a product as one that is "essential to the use of
purpose of the article" or one that "affects the cost or quality of the article," and providing
that a claimant must prove that a product's design features are primarily nonfunctional
for an actionable trade dress infringement claim).
107. See Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 53, at 254 (noting that knockoffs, unlike
counterfeits, are not sold in an attempt to pass as the original).
108. See id. at 267 (discussing how knockoff fashion products can be presented as
cheaper alternatives to high-end original designs).
109. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 384-85
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the defendant's prominent "DB" label would not be confused
with Louis Vuitton's "LV" label and did not constitute trademark infringement).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (prohibiting the placement in commerce of any goods
in which a registered trademark has been copied without the consent of the registrant);
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (providing that trademark
law gives producers the exclusive right to use their trademark); Louis Vuitton Malletier,
561 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (providing that reproduction of a registered trademark constitutes
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act).
111. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123




to follow trends and be "in fashion.""2 Some people attach
importance to the trademarks of the goods they own.113 Others,
however, are more interested in substance than source."4 They
want to make purchases based on aesthetic appearance, within
constraints such as affordability and availability. Allowing
trademark law to possess super copyright and design patent
powers reduces their options. And inhibiting the availability of
affordable knockoff versions of attractive consumer goods makes
obtaining counterfeit goods the only way to satiate lusty
aesthetic desires on a budget.
1. Post-Sale Confusion. While knockoffs do not deceive
consumers, they may sometimes confuse or fool third-party
observers who either do not have access to the tags, labels, and
other marks that are embedded in a product, or do not recognize
the marks they are seeing. Jeremy Sheff has described and aptly
derided this as "bystander confusion.""' The least doctrinally
coherent judicial opinions arise when the knockoff goods at issue
look like more expensive products in form and appearance but
bear unambiguously dissimilar trademarks. Courts will often
concede that consumers are not confused about what they are
purchasing, but instead express concern that the lesser
merchandise enables those in possession to "confuse" observers
into thinking they have spent money (or have the money to
spend) on expensive goods."' Judges who consider these claims
actionable generally frame this rationale as post-sale confusion."'
112. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 44, at 1158.
113. Id. at 1177-78 (noting that some consumers value brand image and authenticity
of the original).
114. See Ariel Kaminer, A Hat So In, It's Got to Be Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at
NJ1 (discussing the growing popularity of knockoff fedoras); Ruth La Ferla, Fakes Now
Dangle on Arms that Once Sported Brand Names, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at ST3
(noting that some consumers do not care whether their purchases are knockoffs or
originals).
115. Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1798867.
116. See, e.g., Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting an effect on the public when a buyer passes off a knockoff as the
authentic item); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (concluding that a visitor's likelihood of
confusion between a luxury item and a knockoff rendered the trademark infringement
claim actionable); Sheff, supra note 115 (manuscript at 23-25) (discussing these cases and
the post-sale confusion doctrine).
117. See, e.g., Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1057-58 (D. Or. 2008) (declaring that post-sale confusion occurs when someone other than
the purchaser confuses the source of the product); Hermis, 219 F.3d at 108-09
(identifying post-sale confusion as the possibility that a third party may be believe a
knockoff to be the genuine article).
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This doctrine is used to curtail the aesthetic range of products
that can be distributed by discount manufacturers."5 The
confusion abjured in these cases is not consumer confusion about
the source of the product at the point of purchase. Instead, a
judge will wield trademark law as a weapon to reduce confusion
among third parties about the wealth or spending inclinations of
consumers with whom they interact.11
Back in 1955, the seeds of the modem post-sale confusion
doctrine germinated within a fertile judicial abhorrence of
illegitimately obtained prestige.12 0 A manufacturer of expensive
clocks brought a series of trademark actions in state court
against a competitor that copied what the manufacturer claimed
was a unique and original design. 2' The competitor deployed its
own trademark on the faces of the clocks it produced and in
advertisements and argued, in a declaratory judgment action in
federal court, that the differences between the two products were
significant enough to make consumer confusion unlikely.'2 2
Repulsed by the unabashed copying, the Second Circuit
concluded that trademark law dictated that consumers who
wanted an expensive looking clock should have to pay for the
privilege, holding:
[Some customers would buy [the competitor's] cheaper
clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by
displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes
would regard as a prestigious article. [The competitor's]
wrong thus consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be
likely to assume that the clock was [the more expensive]
clock.123
Contemporary courts employing the post-sale confusion
doctrine to justify trademark-based action against noncounterfeit
knockoffs will usually concede that consumers are not confused
about what they are purchasing.'2 4 Instead, these judges will
express concern that knockoff merchandise enables those in
possession of knockoffs to "confuse" observers into thinking they
118. See Sheff, supra note 115 (manuscript at 23) (noting that post-sale confusion is
used "to prevent the sale of knock-off luxury goods").
119. For a much richer account, see Sheff, supra note 115 (manuscript at 35).
120. See Mastercrafters, 221 F.2d at 466-67.
121. Id. at 465.
122. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 209, 210-12, 215-16 (seeking a declaratory judgment that it
was not unfairly competing), rev'd, 221 F.2d 466.
123. Mastercrafters, 221 F.2d at 466.
124. See, e.g., Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the lack of evidence for point-of-sale confusion).
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have spent money (or have the money to spend) on expensive
goods.' For example, concerns about post-sale confusion led to a
finding of trademark infringement in Hermas International v.
Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc.,126 even though the defendants
did not use the name "Hermis" on their products and openly
acknowledged to customers that their products were copies of
Hermbs designs.127 The court premised liability on the fact that
the defendants had still "attempt[ed] to encourage consumer
confusion in the post-sale context" and were therefore incorrectly
deemed guilty of trademark infringement.'28
There is nothing in the Lanham Act, or its legislative
history, that expressly accords trademark law the obligation or
right to "protect" unwary observers from mistakenly assuming,
based on a cursory design inspection, that a handbag carried by
another person was manufactured by Hermes if she was actually
toting a less expensive knockoff pocketbook. But judicial
revulsion at the prospect that third-party observers might
incorrectly believe some cheap or lower income person owned an
actual Hermes item was enough to vest Hermbs designs with
super copyright protections channeled through trademark law.
The court asserted in its ruling: "[A] loss occurs when a
sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the
public as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing
public and achieving the status of owning the genuine article at a
knockoff price."12 Precisely what the viewing public loses, if
anything, goes unstated. Hermbs may have lost sales to a
competitor who made a product that some consumers found more
attractive in terms of price, quality, or value, but because the
purchased bag was neither counterfeit nor the subject of
consumer confusion, it is not a compensable wrong under
trademark law.
It is not only manufacturers of uiber-expensive luxury goods
who leverage the post-sale confusion doctrine to attain and
defend monopolies over aesthetic features. The athletic shoe
company Adidas, which uses three diagonal side stripes as a
trademark on its footwear, successfully used trademark law to
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id. at 107-08, 110-11 (reversing the district court's judgment for injunctive
relief in favor of the defendant Lederer and remanding the case for further proceedings).
127. Id. at 107.
128. Id. at 107-09 (alteration in original) (quoting Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris
Fifth Ave., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), afTd in part, rev'd in part, 219 F.3d
104).
129. Id. at 109.
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prevent Payless from selling competing shoes bearing two or four
similarly situated stripes.o Three stripes is a registered Adidas
trademark. Two and four stripes were adopted as decorative
attributes by Payless.' The Payless shoes did not bear a single
Adidas trademark, nor anything that could be even arguably
confused with the Adidas word mark.
Nobody who bought their sneakers at Payless thought they
were purchasing Adidas athletic shoes. Children who wore the
Payless trainers to school knew they were not wearing Adidas,
and so did the other students, who might well have pointed this
out less than tactfully. But based on the possibility third-party
observers might accidentally assume that Payless customers
were actually in possession of Adidas products because they did
not stop and count the number of side stripes, Payless had to stop
using stripes as a design feature.132
Adidas secured the right to monopolize three stripes as a
source indicator when the company registered three stripes as a
trademark." But Adidas should have to tolerate the aesthetic
use of other stripe configurations by competitors. Stripes are a
long-standing and culturally pervasive design element. When a
company chooses to adopt one particular manifestation of a
commonplace pre-existing aesthetic feature as a trademark, it
assumes the risk that competitors will continue to deploy the
decorative feature in alternative configurations.
Payless copied the style of Adidas athletic shoes, gambling
that its customers wanted sneakers with stripes on the side even
130. Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1053-54 (D.
Or. 2008).
131. Id. at 1042.
132. See id. at 1057-59 (applying the doctrine of post-sale confusion in Payless's
motion for summary judgment); Susan Scafidi, Adidas v. Payless: 3 Stripes, You're Out,
COUNTERFEIT CHIC (May 8, 2008, 8:44 PM), http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2008/05/
adidas-v-payless_3_stripes-you.php (reporting a jury finding of infringement against
Payless); Dan Slater, Adidas v. Payless: $100 Million for Every Stripe, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (May 7, 2008, 12:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/07/adidas-v-payless-100-
million-for-every-stripe-payless-could-pay-more/ (noting a jury award of $305 million in
damages to Adidas as compensation for Payless's infringement).
133. ADIDAS THE MARK WITH THE 3 STRIPES, Registration No. 641,906.
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if there were two or four stripes, and the items obviously had not
been manufactured by Adidas. The functionality doctrine should
have served Payless as well as it did American Eagle
Outfitters.' 4 But it did not, and the associated judicial opinion is
pervaded by an almost visceral contempt for consumers who
purchase and wear Payless footwear.13






The word marks are very different, but the symbols are
somewhat similarly swoosh-esque. All five symbols make
comparable stylistic statements when they are sewn onto the
sides of athletic shoes, intended to make the products that bear
them visually appealing as well as commercially distinctive. In
the context of fashion design, Hemphill and Suk describe a
related phenomenon they call "flocking," whereby the producers
of goods follow the same trends because consumers like to stay in
step with each other.13 1 If Payless had adopted two or four stripes
as a mark as well as a design feature, its deployment of stripes
might have been more favorably viewed as falling within the
134. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
135. See Adidas, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 ("Relatively unsophisticated value-conscious
customers are more likely to be attracted to, and confused by imitations of [Aldidas'
Three-Stripe Mark.").
136. Hempill & Suk, supra note 44, at 1152.
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norms and customs of the athletic shoe industry. 7  The
company's strictly aesthetic use of stripes is far less problematic
from a likelihood of confusion standpoint,"' and it absolutely
should have been permissible.
The post-sale confusion doctrine facilitates trademark
actions against goods that "offer[ ] consumers a cheap knockoff
copy of the original manufacturer's more expensive product, thus
allowing a buyer to acquire the prestige of owning what appears
[based upon design features] to be the more expensive product.""'
It is in obvious conflict with the holdings in the Sears and
Compco cases, which clearly stand for the proposition that
product design regulation is the provenance of other intellectual
property laws and cannot be monopolized via trademark law.'40
Judicial deployment of a post-sale confusion doctrine, which
makes copying design elements actionable under trademark law
when they are uncoupled from consumer confusion, reflects
pitched resistance to the idea that copying product design can
constitute fair competition. It also indicates an underlying and
incontrovertibly incorrect assumption that promoting the
exclusivity of the nontrademarkable aesthetic attributes of a
137. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 858 & n.10
(noting that the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board has repeatedly concluded that
shoe manufacturers frequently employ stripe designs on the sides of their athletic
shoes).
138. See In re The Lucky Co., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 422, 423 (T.T.A.B. 1980)
(proclaiming that the abundance of similar stripe and bar trademarks in the athletic shoe
industry results in marks that "are extremely weak and certainly entitled to only a very
narrow and limited scope of protection"); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 721, 760-64 (2004).
139. Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.
2000) (defining post-sale confusion); see Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale
Confusion Doctrine: Why the General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of
Confusion Inquiry, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3338 (1999) ("{I]n light of the dual aim of
trademark law to protect the interests of both the public and the trademark owner, the
use of a trademark likely to cause confusion among the general public in a post-sale
context should be actionable under federal trademark law."); Ginia Bellafante, A 'Satire'
of a Classic Fails to Amuse the August House of Hermas, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2003, at B8
("The action ... represents newly vigorous steps taken by Hermas in the United States to
impede the sale and distribution of not only counterfeit Birkin and Kelly bags (those
falsely marked with the Hermbs insignia) but also others. . marketed openly as
knockoffs.").
140. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964)
(holding that design features that are not otherwise entitled to patent or copyright
protection are in the public domain and may be copied at will); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964) (explaining that product design monopolies do not
extend beyond the expiration of patent protection); Barrett, supra note 38, at 143-44
(contending that the Sears and Compco cases stand for the proposition that trademark
and trade dress protection do not extend to unpatented product features that would
otherwise be protected by a utility or design patent).
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luxury good is an appropriate objective of trademark law."' It
further suggests a high level of contempt for shoppers whose
purchases are driven by the style and design of an object rather
than by its brand name. Owning something attractive and stylish
that does not bear an elite trademark is derogated via the post-
sale confusion doctrine as a disreputable effort to reap from
society the perception of good taste based upon the aesthetic
appearance of a material possession, rather than based on its
trademark, from which social status assessments are more
properly made.
Owning items bearing elite trademarks may signal affluence
and good taste, but it is not at all apparent that the Lanham Act
countenances using trademark rights to "protect" exclusivity in
conspicuous consumption, or that trademark law is even
necessary to perform this role.'42 One suspects that people who
actually care how much someone else paid for a wristwatch easily
discern the difference between a Timex and a Rolex, regardless of
any similarity in design. The vertical market diffusion of
aesthetically pleasing designs should not be cabined by distorted
applications of the Lanham Act. Trademark law was never
intended to interfere with aesthetic self-expression.'4 3
IV. RETAILING COUNTERFEIT CONSUMER GOODS SHOULD NOT BE
A CRIME
Copyright law scholars have done a good job explaining why
copyright infringement should not be criminalized.1' For similar
141. See Lunney, supra note 2, at 407-08 (advancing the idea that protection of
prestige goods represents a "radical shift from trademark's deception-based foundations").
142. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) ("The
Lanham Act was intended to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks'
and 'to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition.'" (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2006))); McKenna, supra note 1, at 1907-09 (noting that a concern for the
prestige value of products represents a marked shift from traditional trademark law);
Sheff, supra note 115 (manuscript at 25) (questioning whether trademark law should
protect "past purchasers of genuine luxury goods who must now abide a lower degree of
exclusivity").
143. See generally Sheff, supra note 115 (manuscript at 44-45) (contending that the
post-sale confusion doctrine burdens the social expressions of poor consumers who seek to
express messages through consumption of knockoff goods).
144. See, e.g., Horace E. Anderson, Jr., "Criminal Minded?": Mixtape DJs, The Piracy
Paradox, and Lessons for the Recording Industry, 76 TENN. L. REV. 111, 145-52 (2008)
(advancing that copyright owners should forgo enforcement of rights against mixtape DJs
because of their value-enhancing effects to copyrighted works); Eric Goldman, A Road to
No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L.
REV. 369, 414-26 (2003) (criticizing the broad scope of the No Electronic Theft Act and its
potential to criminalize minor, common, and socially beneficial file-sharing activities);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of
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reasons, the same is true for selling counterfeit products: the
economic losses caused by counterfeits are exaggerated, 4 5 the
people who are arrested have not typically benefitted greatly
from the counterfeiting, 146  and the deterrent effect of
criminalization is highly questionable.4 7
Counterfeiting is an important trademark law issue. It is the
act of putting someone else's exact trademark on products that
were not produced or authorized by the trademark holder.148
Courts do not demand evidence of actual confusion in
counterfeiting cases.' Customers are assumed to have been
deceived, even when they are paying below market prices in
extremely dodgy circumstances.o It is unlikely that someone
who purchases a watch marked "Rolex" for ten dollars at a flea
market thinks she has procured an actual Rolex if she knows
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 861-64 (1999) (questioning the expansive scope of activities subject to
criminal copyright under the No Electronic Theft Act); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining
Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright
Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 801-07 (2005) (discussing the nonmonetary costs associated
with the criminalization of copyright laws); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of
Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83
B.U. L. REV. 731, 778-83 (2003) (demonstrating that criminal theory fails to support
treating noncommercial copyright infringement as a crime); Jessica Litman, Sharing and
Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 17-23 (2004) (discussing the practical
problems that have resulted from a narrowed public domain); Alfred C. Yen, What
Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003
WIs. L. REV. 649, 672-79 (examining the effect of criminal sanctions under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act as a solution to digital copyright infringement).
145. See Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by Multinational
Companies on Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 793-97 (2011) (critiquing the
statistics and assumptions multinational companies use to calculate economic losses).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 627-29 (5th Cir. 2006) (charging
illegal immigrants for selling counterfeit goods, items ranging from "sixty-five cents to
$1.25 each"); Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(finding sufficient probable cause to arrest a street vendor who sold pendants and
"cheaply priced goods bearing unauthorized trademarks").
147. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381,
1393-95 (2005) (suggesting that the legal means to deter counterfeiting are ineffective
due to the difficulty of bringing trade dress claims and the limited expectation of property
rights in fashion design).
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1127 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1) (2006).
149. See A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 202-03
(3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that the Lanham Act does not require a finding of actual
confusion, but rather a likelihood of confusion); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133
(5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the Lanham Act only requires a likelihood of confusion).
150. See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806-08 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding it was
unnecessary to show actual confusion in a criminal counterfeiting case); Yamin, 868 F.2d
at 133 (concluding that despite testimony from consumers that they were not deceived as
to the authenticity of the goods, the evidence was sufficient to find a "potential to deceive
or to cause confusion or mistake").
740 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [48:4
anything about the reputation of that brand. A consumer
purchasing luxury goods from street vendors at astonishing
discounts is unlikely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived about
whether the goods are counterfeit or legitimate in the trademark
sense, but may be unsure about whether the luxury goods are
illegitimate in the chain of acquisition context, which is to say,
stolen.
But courts do not care if the consumer has been deceived or
not. Trademark holders have the legal right to prevent a person
from appearing to be wearing an expensive watch such as a
Rolex, if she has not purchased, borrowed, inherited, or stolen an
actual expensive watch.' Courts will always provide a mark
holder a cause of action against abject counterfeiters, as the
unauthorized use of identical marks on identical goods is the
prototypical act of infringement the Lanham Act was enacted to
protect against.15 2 Adorning goods with a confusingly similar (but
nonidentical) mark will also constitute actionable trademark
infringement,"' and uses of such infringing marks are, in most
respects, treated like acts of counterfeiting, with the exception
that no one goes to jail.154
Counterfeiting is a problem for consumers who are
defrauded by it, and it can pose serious dangers if counterfeit
goods are unfit for whatever purpose the authentic version is
151. See Yamin, 868 F.2d at 132-33 (explaining that section 2320(a) of the
Trademark Infringement Act of 1984 protects trademark holders from the
"cheapening and dilution" of genuine products by counterfeit goods in the post-sale
context).
152. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309, 1311 n.2, 1311-14 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding a counterfeiter liable under section 1114 of the Lanham Act based on
the counterfeiter's offer to sell Levi Strauss labels to affix to non-Levi Stauss jeans); Hard
Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1152 n.6 (7th Cir.
1992) (allowing a cause of action to proceed on the basis of contributory liability when a
company sold counterfeit shirts at a flea market).
153. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1285-86, 1290
(9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a claim of trademark infringement when one brother named
his cheese business "Joseph Gallo" after the family's wine business registered eleven
different "Gallo" trademarks); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (8th
Cir. 1980) (affirming the district court's holding that use of the mark "Quirst" infringed on
the established mark "Squirt").
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (providing that any person who copies a
registered mark without the permission of the registrant is subject to civil liability); 18
U.S.C. § 2320(a) (Supp. II 2009) (providing criminal sanctions for the counterfeiting of
goods); United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2005) (adopting the
view that the post-sale confusion doctrine also applies to the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act); United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1987) ("In our
view, Congress thereby manifested its intent that section 2320(d)(1)(A)(iii) be given
the same interpretation as is given the identical language in section 1114(a) of the
Lanham Act.").
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intended to perform.155 But counterfeiting is a boon to consumers
who would like to purchase what appear to be authentic goods at
deeply discounted prices.'56 Trademark laws are solicitous of the
first group, those victimized by counterfeiting, and contemptuous
of the second, those benefitting from it.'57 The comparative size of
these factions would be interesting to know. My guess is that
most people know whether they are purchasing something
authentic or counterfeit. Whether this is true for goods purchased
via online auctions is a bit murkier.
The legal framework set up to prevent and punish
counterfeiting is somewhat severe. Anyone directly associated
with a counterfeiting enterprise can be jailed and fined as a
matter of criminal law, if convicted."' Anyone involved in a fairly
removed way with the production or distribution of counterfeits
can be held contributorily or vicariously liable for acts of
counterfeiting as a matter of civil law."' The various burdens of
these draconian approaches to discouraging and policing
counterfeiting fall disproportionately on poor people.'
For a vendor, having a product stolen results in concrete and
easily calculable economic losses, and imposes the cost of
manufacturing a replacement. Having a product counterfeited
may mean a lost sale, and possibly a consumer who is
disappointed in the quality of a particular line of goods if she was
155. See Chow, supra note 145, at 800 (noting that consumers who unknowingly
purchase counterfeit products are often harmed by substandard products).
156. Id. at 796-97.
157. See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that
the post-sale confusion doctrine is an appropriate consideration under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act because a trademark owner has a right to control his trademark's
reputation); Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 12-13 (explaining that in enacting the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, Congress sought to protect "innocent purchasers, 'who pay
for brand-name quality and take home only a fake'" (quoting S. REP. No. 98-526, at 4
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3630)).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (Supp. II 2009) (providing that any person who
intentionally traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark is subject
to two million dollars in criminal penalties and ten years of imprisonment).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (providing that any person who uses a counterfeit
trademark in connection with the sale of goods or services is subject to liability in a civil
action); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-50
(7th Cir. 1992) (describing contributory negligence and vicarious liability theories in the
context of trademark infringement).
160. See United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding
a lower court's conviction of an individual vendor selling counterfeit merchandise out of
his home and, later, his store in a strip mall); U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT, at 179-80, U.N.
Sales No. E.10.IV.6 (2010) ("[Tlhe most common conduit for counterfeit goods are illegal
immigrants, working in informal markets ... [who] often bear the brunt of
[counterfeiting] enforcement efforts . . . .").
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unaware that she purchased a counterfeit. 6 ' However, if the
consumer intentionally opted for a counterfeit item, she did not
actually want to purchase the authentic item, so no one lost a
sale, and she knows not to blame the legitimate mark holder for
any quality deficiencies.162 But the mark holder is still
unequivocally deemed, by well-established trademark principles,
to have been harmed or damaged by such counterfeiting.' In
this way, trademark law tries to ensure that no one can legally
possess the status of a brand they cannot afford.
If someone merely copies the aesthetic style of a bicycle, but
not the trademark, this is a copyright or design patent matter
only, as explained above. Even when deploying trademark law in
error, many judges stop at deeming aesthetic copying a
trademark infringement a civil law matter. However, in the
context of aesthetically driven consumer goods especially, some
courts emphatically do not like to see consumers get a bargain.'6 4
In consequence, they illegitimately and far too readily treat
copying as if it was actual counterfeiting.
Whether counterfeit goods truly harm the market for the
authorized goods probably varies greatly from product to product.
Sales are obviously lost if a customer incorrectly believes she is
purchasing an authentic item. But consumers who cannot afford
expensive goods or do not want to pay for them choose counterfeit
items knowingly. They procure them from stores, swap meets,
161. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 4 ("Selling items bearing counterfeit
marks defrauds customers who pay for brand-name merchandise but bring home low
quality fakes. It cheats trademark owners out of legitimate sales and tarnishes their
reputation when they are blamed for the poor quality of the counterfeit merchandise. It
also injures legitimate retailers who must provide refunds to customers who discover that
their brand-name goods are in fact counterfeit.").
162. See Chow, supra note 145, at 796-97 (contending that not every sale of a
counterfeit good results in a loss to multinational corporations because "most consumers
who purchase counterfeits make a knowing and rational choice to do so and are not
deceived").
163. See United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Section
2320(a) is 'not just designed for the protection of consumers. [It is] likewise fashioned for
the protection of trademarks themselves and for the prevention of the cheapening and
dilution of the genuine product.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gantos,
817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987))).
164. See Hermbs Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d
Cir. 2000) (stating that cheap knockoff copies of original, more expensive products harm
the general public who may believe they are purchasing the genuine article);
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,
221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding actionable the copying of a clock design because
consumers would buy the cheaper knockoff to give the appearance they owned the more
prestigious clock); Lunney, supra note 2, at 407-08 (asserting that courts preserve the
status of "prestige goods" to allow manufacturers to maintain the "artificial scarcity" of
those goods).
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flea markets, sidewalk vendors, and online auctions. It can be
difficult to understand why, beyond an impulse to rote
conformity. Counterfeit luxury items are unlikely to be mistaken
for the originals by anyone who pays attention to trademarks.
One observer snidely noted with respect to imitation Louis
Vuitton bags:
We know some people appreciate the "status" of
owning a designer bag and flaunting that designer's name.
It's all about showing how much money you have and how
you can buy something so exclusive. So explain to us what
you're gaining when you go and buy a cheap imitation of
the bag that's supposed to give you "status." You're carrying
something that isn't authentic, doesn't impress anyone, and
is freely advertising a designer who didn't even make the
bag. You paid $20 at your local Chinatown and everyone
knows it.165
Some purchasers must believe that a counterfeit object will
fool some people some of the time. But what percentage of
purchasers that represents is difficult to ascertain. If a
counterfeit item is unlikely to be mistaken for an authentic item,
maybe it is purchased simply because the object's aesthetics are
pleasing to the buyer. Unless the trademark was intrinsic to the
aesthetics, consumer demand could have been noninfringingly
met with a knockoff. Knockoffs are less risky for vendors or
anyone associated with the vendors, but they can still be treated
as illegal if they are deemed to infringe copyrights by being too
similar to a copyrighted item, or to infringe trademarks by being
likely to confuse consumers. If acts of infringement are deemed
willful, the economic punishments can be severe, but criminal
prosecution is unlikely if the copying of copyrighted attributes is
not literal, and/or if the defendant trademark is not "identical to
or substantially indistinguishable" from the one it is accused of
infringing. 6 1
A. The Intersection of Counterfeiting and Class
When poor people can own products with the same design
features employed in expensive goods, those goods may become
165. Mass e-mail from luv2shop@thebudgetfashionista.com to author (excerpt from
an e-mail with the subject, "Greetings! Five Things To Throw Out Of Your Closet Right
Now") (on file with author).
166. See Carol Noonan & Jeffery Raskin, Intellectual Property Crimes, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 971, 987-88, 993-94 (2001) (noting that proof of identical or substantially similar
copying is the "threshold requirement" for criminal sanctions).
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tainted by this association in the minds of some observers.'67
Trademarks are a mechanism that can be used to signal status
when the exclusivity of aesthetics alone cannot be relied upon.
Counterfeiting is punished not only because it can defraud
consumers and divert income from trademark holders, but also
because it allows poor people to possess and display trademarks
intended to be the exclusive purview of the wealthy.'
Retail outlets that facilitate peer-to-peer merchandise
exchanges may intentionally or unintentionally facilitate the
distribution of counterfeit goods. They have been burdened with
heavy policing costs by case law endorsing a broad construction
of secondary liability for trademark infringement.' Vicarious
liability and contributory liability are the legal doctrines through
which entities are held civilly responsible for acts of trademark
infringement carried out by others.' These forms of liability
have been imposed when an entity profits in some way from the
sale of counterfeit goods that it supposedly knows or should know
is occurring.'
Shopping at flea markets is unlike browsing department
stores. It is harder to predict what merchandise will be available
on any given day at a flea market, or where it will be located. The
provenance of the goods at a flea market may be exceptionally
murky, and if your purchase disappoints you in some way, you
are unlikely to be able to return it for a full refund. But, at flea
markets, there may be a diverse range of objects unavailable at
other shopping venues, and the prices are apt to be lower than
one might find elsewhere and sometimes negotiable. Flea
markets are often staffed and frequented by poor people.
167. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 44, at 1176 (relating the possibility of the
"'snob' effect" lowering the demand for luxury goods because of the dilution of the brand
(quoting H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of
Consumers'Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 189 (1950))).
168. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 16; Hemphill & Suk, supra note 44, at
1175-76.
169. See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 39,
at 832-34 (arguing against imposing the contributory infringement doctrine on
intermediaries).
170. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982)
(establishing a contributory liability theory of trademark infringement for third parties
who induce or supply products the manufacturer knows or should know infringe another's
trademark); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the Seventh Circuit's adoption of a vicarious liability
theory of trademark infringement); Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace:
Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort
Liability for Conduct Occurring over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729,
752-53 (1996) (summarizing theories of indirect trademark liability).
171. See Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 853-54.
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Well-attended flea markets incentivize both positive and
negative behaviors. They are a mechanism to channel objects
that are no longer wanted by some people into the hands of
consumers who desire them. This is environmentally and
culturally beneficial. Industrious flea market vendors may
frequent yard sales to procure merchandise, deriving profits from
things that otherwise might be relegated to landfills.
Flea markets typically feature merchandise that is outside
more conventional commercial channels because it is used,
flawed, or sometimes, counterfeit. Given their decentralized
structure, flea markets also may incentivize theft, as they
provide a commercial outlet for stolen goods. Both counterfeiting
and theft are illegal activities, but the harms they inflict are
different.'7 2
Criminalizing counterfeiting was supposed to deter
counterfeitinag by increasing the risks and costs of doing business
substantially.7 1 In practice, it has meant that minimum and
subminimum wage workers weather the risks and absorb the
associative costs on behalf of people actually producing and
distributing counterfeit goods. 74 It has also given venues like flea
markets the ethos of criminal enterprises. People staffing booths
at which counterfeit items are for sale can be arrested,
handcuffed, and taken to jail."' Probable cause for such arrests
can include low prices and the presence of counterfeit merchandise
172. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 16-17 (contrasting the ability of a property
owner to take steps to decrease the risk of theft against the fact that a trademark owner can be
victimized without their knowledge from an unforeseeable source).
173. See id. at 10-13 (discussing criminal penalties as deterrence for counterfeiters who
regarded civil penalties under the Lanham Act as merely the "cost of doing business").
174. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 160, at 180.
175. Consider, for example, the facts from the Scarbrough case:
On April 6, 1997, Myles and Hall, wearing plain clothes, went to the Mobile Flea
Market accompanied by Jim Holder, a trademark infringement investigator and
independent contractor who represents various corporations in sting operations
with local police departments. Hall purchased two Nike pendants, one from each
of the plaintiffs-appellees Tammy D. Scarbrough and Carol C. Davis, employees
of Marion Douglas, who owned the booth.
Hall showed the pendants to Holder, who verified that they bore
unauthorized trademarks. Hall later averred that he determined that this
verification by Holder, in conjunction with Scarbrough and Davis's sale of
cheaply priced goods bearing unauthorized trademarks, which were in proximity
to other booths selling goods with unauthorized trademarks, was sufficient
probable cause for their arrests. Hall subsequently returned to the booth,
arrested Scarbrough and Davis, and handcuffed them together while he arrested
other sellers of counterfeit goods. Scarbrough, Davis, and the other arrestees
were transported to Mobile Police Headquarters and then to Mobile Metro Jail.
Their employer, Douglas, posted bond, and they were released that night.
Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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at nearby booths."' There is no requirement that any particular
victim prove any sort of loss beforehand."' If convicted, ten-year
prison terms can be imposed upon first time offenders, and fines of
up to two million dollars."' Second convictions are punishable by up
to twenty years in prison and five million dollars in fines."'
In addition to flea markets, storefront and online retail
businesses may facilitate the sale of counterfeit goods, but also
vend noncounterfeit merchandise that is used, scratched, dented,
or otherwise flawed and, therefore, deeply discounted. Though
manufacturers may be happy to take advantage of these outlets
when they need to liquidate flawed merchandise or overruns, mark
holders may be less enthusiastic about the circulation of technically
authentic merchandise that undercuts brand-based pricing
regimes."'
While policing counterfeiting protects consumers as well as
mark holders in some circumstances, the benefits to customers of
harsh secondary liability paradigms are arguably outweighed by
the disadvantages. Preventing fraud against consumers may be a
worthwhile goal, but the expansive vicarious and contributory
liability cases like Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. ' indicate
176. E.g., id. at 1302-03 ("Prior to consulting with Holder, Hall determined that he
had probable cause to arrest Scarbrough and Davis based on three factors: (1) each had
sold him an unlawful Nike pendant, (2) in his opinion, the price of the pendants was
below what he would have expected a similar, legitimate item to cost, and (3) numerous
other sellers were engaged in selling trademark-infringing items near Scarbrough and
Davis." (footnote omitted)). "Hall purchased a Nike pendant from Scarbrough for $3 and a
gold Nike pendant from Davis for $11." Id. at 1302 n.5.
177. Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 21.
It is also worthwhile to note what the statute does not require. In particular,
there is no requirement of loss by any particular victim. The government is not
required to prove that the rightful owner of the mark would have made
additional sales but for the sales by the counterfeiter, or that the value of its
mark was diminished. In the legislative history, Congress noted that the bill was
intended to reach all counterfeiting that affects interstate commerce, specifically
including "trafficking that is discovered in its incipiency, such as before
counterfeit merchandise has left the factory." Thus, the government need not
show any unjust enrichment by the counterfeiter, who may actually have lost money
on the counterfeiting operations. Nor is it necessary to prove that the product
received under the counterfeit mark was somehow faulty and caused any
consequential loss or harm to the recipient. Indeed, it is not even necessary to
demonstrate that the product received is of lesser quality than the genuine product.
Id. at 21 (footnote omitted) (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 31,677 (1984) (Joint Statement on
Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation)).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (Supp. II 2009).
179. Id.; Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 71.
180. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 8, at 16.
181. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing contributory liability in the trademark context and vicarious liability in the
copyright context).
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contempt for poor, working-class people who acquire inexpensive
or used goods at flea markets and swap meets. "Indirect" vendors
such as online auction platforms cannot ascertain whether an
item is authentic or counterfeit because they are never in its
physical presence.'8 2 Rational risk avoidance will motivate them
to avoid certain trademarks altogether, out of fear of inaccurately
assessing the authenticity of a marked item. In this way, the
Lanham Act impedes the ability of people of limited economic
means to legitimately acquire expensive, high-status
merchandise at reduced prices.
V. LIBERATING KNOCKOFFS FROM THE LANHAM ACT
The trademark law reasoning for depriving poor and
penny-pinching people of noncounterfeit knockoffs is
oppressively grounded in flawed and unpersuasive justifications
for giving trademark and trade dress protection to product
features and configurations. Adopting and enforcing a bright-line
rule that aesthetically driven, unregistered design attributes are
not monopolizable through trademark law, regardless of whether
they have secondary meaning, would liberate knockoffs from the
tyranny of Lanham Act misuses. This could be achieved through
an amendment to the statute itself: sections 2 and 43(a) of the
Lanham Act could be amended to make it clear that aesthetic, as
well as utilitarian, functionality precludes both federal
registration and common law protection of product features as
trademarks or trade dress, regardless of secondary meaning.
Alternatively, the legality of knockoffs under trademark law
could be clarified and concretized even without changes to the
statute, through robust judicial deployment of a functionality
doctrine that explicitly embraces aesthetic functionality as a
complete bar to Lanham Act protection regardless of
distinctiveness. The multifactored test used by many courts in
determining whether a product feature is functional inquires
into:
(1) the existence of a utility patent, expired or unexpired,
that involves or describes the functionality of an item's
design element; (2) the utilitarian properties of the [item]'s
unpatented design elements; (3) advertising of the item
that touts the utilitarian advantages of the item's design
elements; (4) the dearth of, or difficulty in creating,
182. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010)




alternative designs for the item's purpose; and (5) the effect
of the design feature on an item's quality or cost.183
This is not well adapted to aesthetic properties when the
emphasis is on a product's appearance for its own sake, whether
or not the design has some connection to a particular source, due
to market domination or saturation advertising.
A better test would analyze each product attribute and
categorize it as primarily a mark, or primarily aesthetic in
nature, based on how it is integrated into the product. A fact
finder, be it judge or jury, would make this determination based
on how a reasonable person would interpret the feature's primary
nature. Attributes deemed primarily aesthetic would be
categorized as functional, and thus available to competitors.
Secondary meaning would be entirely removed from the
initial deliberations, and would come into play only after a
finding that a particular attribute was primarily functioning as a
mark. Design features that were deemed to function primarily as
marks would be protectable only upon a showing of secondary
meaning, and even then, some marks would receive narrow
protection to prevent interference with use of similar designs.
VI. CONCLUSION
People who purchase discount brand items because that is
all they have the money to afford may find it slightly less
humiliating to wear or use goods that at least look like more
socially acceptable brands. Companies like Wal-Mart and Payless
meet the needs of folks who want to follow contemporary styles
but cannot afford to worry about trademarks. Trademark law as
currently constituted puts this option in constant jeopardy,
reducing the choices available to people of limited economic
means, and also to people who simply prefer to limit their
spending on aesthetically driven consumer goods.
People across economic classes value the ability to own
consumer goods that reflect their personal aesthetics. For some,
elite trademarks are important parts of the images they want to
portray. As Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have noted,
"some consumers appear to treat labels as almost an end in
themselves" and are eager to acquire whatever goods a particular
designer produces.'84 They may relish exclusivity and the status
that they feel owning expensive luxury goods confers. They may
183. Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011
(N.D. Ill. 2007), affd, 616 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2010).
184. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1215.
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also be highly predisposed to intentionally purchasing counterfeit
items that are authentic looking. But just as knockoffs are not of
interest to these consumers, neither are they a threat, because
they do not compromise the trademark value of authentic
designer goods to like-minded consumers in either the legal or
colloquial sense of the term.
For others, making a visual statement with their clothing
and other personal possessions is what is most important.
Secondary concerns about price and quality make trademarks
important but not critical to their purchasing decisions. They
care more about overall appearance, as an aesthetic matter, than
about what the labels that possessions carry communicate about
economic status. When affordable knockoffs are available,
consumers who covet the designs of luxury items do not need to
purchase counterfeit items to possess them. In consequence,
liberating knockoffs from the Lanham Act actually reduces
demand for counterfeits, at least from this second cohort of
consumers.
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